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Annual report and accounts 2006

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Directors’ renumeration report

This report sets out the remuneration policy for the Company’s directors and senior executives in line with statutory requirements and good practice guidelines and describes the elements of their remuneration and discloses the amounts paid to the directors in 2006.

The Remuneration Committee

The key purposes of the Committee are to ensure that the remuneration of senior executives is aligned to the Company’s strategy and that the Company is able to attract, retain and motivate high calibre people within a very competitive international market for talent.

The Committee reviews and recommends to the Board the Company’s remuneration policy and strategy and, within the policy, makes decisions on individual remuneration terms and compensation packages for the executive directors with particular reference to the Company’s performance. The Committee also sets the remuneration structure and terms for the Company’s other senior executives; sets the Chairman’s fee and exercises the powers of the Board in relation to the executive long-term incentive and all-employee share plans. The full terms of reference for the Committee are available from the Group Company Secretary and can be found on the Company’s website www.aviva.com.

Remuneration Committee composition

The following independent non-executive directors served on the Committee during the year:

  Period
Member From To
Richard Karl Goeltz (Chairman) 3 May 2004 To date
Mary Francis 25 January 2006 To date
Carole Piwnica 25 January 2006 To date
André Villeneuve 16 April 1996 31 December 2006

Richard Karl Goeltz succeeded George Paul as the chairman of the Committee in January 2006. The Committee met on five occasions in 2006 and each member attended every meeting. The Group Company Secretary acts as the secretary to the Committee.

The Group Chief Executive is normally invited to attend the meetings of the Committee, except when his own remuneration is being discussed, as is the Group Human Resources Director. The Chairman of the Board is invited to attend the Committee meetings when executive directors’ pay is being discussed.

In line with the Combined Code requirements the Board undertook a review of the effectiveness of all its committees during the year, including the Remuneration Committee.

Advice to the Remuneration Committee

Hilary Oliver, the Group Reward Director, provided material assistance to the Committee during the year, advising on market trends, practices and appropriate levels of remuneration. Deloitte, which provided actuarial, tax and IT services to the Group during the year, advised the Committee on the calculation of total shareholder return for the purposes of the long-term incentive plans. In addition, Nic Nicandrou, in his previous role as Group Financial Control Director provided material assistance to the Committee in relation to its consideration of the financial objectives relevant to the Aviva Annual Bonus Plan and determining the extent to which the objectives had been met. Richard Whitaker, the Group Company Secretary and Linklaters LLP (Linklaters) advised the Committee in relation to the operation of the Company’s share plans. Linklaters provided other legal services to the Group. In addition, the Committee considered the views of the Chairman and Group Chief Executive in assessing the performance of the executive directors.

A review of senior executive pension provisions as described in detail in this report was undertaken during 2005 and 2006. During the review Aon Consulting, which undertook other pensions related work for the Company, advised the Company and Lane Clark & Peacock LLP (LC&P), consulting actuary, was appointed by the Committee to provide an independent opinion on certain aspects of the recommendations arising from the review. LC&P provided no other services to the Group during the year.

Changes to remuneration policy

The remuneration policy is reviewed by the Committee on a regular basis to ensure that it is achieving its objectives and remains appropriate within the market. A major review was undertaken in 2004, which included salaries, annual bonus, share schemes and benefits. In respect of the Company’s share incentive plans the review included all aspects of their operation including the discretions exercised, levels of grant, performance criteria and vesting schedules. The changes resulting from the review became effective in 2005. Pensions and long-term savings benefits were assessed in 2005 and 2006 with the changes becoming effective from 6 April 2006.

The only other modifications made during the year were to the rules of the share plans to ensure compliance with the age discrimination legislation which became effective in October 2006.

Remuneration package

The remuneration package for the Group’s senior executives is described in the table below. It reflects the Board’s philosophy that senior executives’ interests should be aligned with those of the Company’s shareholders, and that, while paying a competitive basic salary, a substantial proportion of the total remuneration package should be closely linked to the performance of the business and paid in shares.

Remuneration package overview: constituent elements at “target” and “stretch” (maximum)

Constituent elements of reward as a percentage of total remuneration

 

The illustrations above would vary slightly for Richard Harvey, whose long-term incentive plan award is 175% of basic salary. The illustrations assume “on target” performance when 30% of an LTIP award vests and “stretch” performance when 100% of an LTIP award vests.

Policy How delivered Details
Total remuneration
  • Basic salary
  • Annual bonus
  • LTIP
  • Pension
  • Long-term savings
  • Benefits
  • All-employee share schemes

Positioned at median against a FTSE 30 comparator group, although account is taken of relative size and complexity of comparator organisations.

Basic salary
Basic salary is benchmarked within the range of median to upper quartile for comparable jobs. Progression within this range is dependent upon performance.
  • Monthly in cash
  • Reviewed annually

Basic salary depends upon:

  • Benchmarked salaries for comparable roles in the FTSE 50 and UK/European financial institutions;
  • An individual’s performance;
  • Predicted market movement;
  • Aviva’s financial performance; and
  • Anticipated pay increases for other Aviva employees.
Annual bonus
The discretionary annual bonus plan exists to motivate directors towards the achievement of the annual business plan.

75% of basic salary is payable for "on target" performance, and up to 150% is payable for "stretch" performance.
  • Annually, one-third is paid in cash and two-thirds in deferred shares.
  • The shares vest on the third anniversary of the date of grant, subject to the recipient remaining in service.
  • A resignation in the year of a bonus award would result in the forfeiture of the shares awarded that year. A resignation in the following year would result in a 50% forfeiture, and in the year after that a 25% forfeiture.
  • All shares would be forfeited should the director be dismissed for cause.

Business performance (of the Aviva Group in the case of the Group Chief Executive and the Group Finance Director and of the Group and appropriate business units in the case of the other executive directors) determines 70% of the bonus awards, with the remainder dependent upon the achievement of personal objectives, relating to strategic action, operating performance and leadership.

“Business performance” covers, inter alia, new business contribution, operating profit, combined operating ratio, total expenses, return on capital employed, customer satisfaction and employee engagement.

Target and maximum bonus levels (75% and 150% of basic salary respectively) were set with reference to the FTSE 30 and a global financial services comparator group. These levels are reviewed annually as part of the total compensation review.

Long-Term Incentive Plan
This plan exists to motivate recipients to achieve the Company’s longer term objectives, to aid the retention of key personnel and to align their interests to those of shareholders.
  • Awards are made annually in the form of restricted shares that vest, subject to performance conditions, at the end of a three year performance period.
  • Awards that do not vest, lapse.
  • The Group Chief Executive is eligible to receive an annual award of shares to the value of 175% of his basic salary. The other executive directors are eligible to be awarded shares to the value of 150% of their basic salary.
  • Under the scheme rules no awards may exceed 200% of a participant’s basic salary.
  • Awards made to other senior employees vary based on an individual’s skills and longer term potential. Normally awards are made between 0% and 150% of basic salary.

Vesting of the shares is dependent upon two equally weighted performance measures; Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) and relative Total Shareholder Return (TSR), reflecting shareholders’ long-term interests in both absolute (ROCE) and relative (TSR) performance.

ROCE vesting – ROCE targets are set annually within the context of the Company’s three-year business plan. Vesting depends upon the Company’s performance over the three-year performance period against a target return. The Group’s external auditor provides a formal opinion on the ROCE calculation.

For awards granted for the three-year performance period commencing 1 January 2006, the Company’s cumulative ROCE over the period must exceed 31.5% for 15% of the shares to vest, with the maximum 50% of shares vesting if the cumulative ROCE exceeds 37.5% over the period.

TSR vesting – 15% of the award vests for median performance rising to 50% vesting for upper quintile performance.

The group of companies against which the Company’s TSR is measured comprises: AEGON, Allianz, AXA, Fortis, Friends Provident, Generali, HBOS, ING, Legal & General, Lloyds TSB, Prudential, The Royal Bank of Scotland, Royal & Sun Alliance and Zurich.These companies were chosen for their product and geographic match to Aviva. An independent consultant determines Aviva’s performance within this group.

In December 2006, the Committee reviewed the appropriateness of relative TSR as a performance measure and agreed to include Standard Life in the above comparator group in respect of future grants.

All employee share plans
To provide employees with the opportunity to acquire Aviva shares, where applicable.
  • Eligible to participate in the Company’s UK all employee share plans.

See details below (“UK All Employee Share Plans”).

Long-term savings
Aviva has taken the opportunity presented by changes to pension legislation to introduce a new long-term saving arrangement, the Aviva Capital Accumulation Plan (ACAP).

Contributions for the executive directors are shown in the Directors' remuneration table below.
  • Discretionary payments into an employee benefit trust operated by independent trustees. Currently those executive directors who are participating are not accruing benefits in the Aviva Staff Pension Scheme.
  • The level of contribution varies but will not normally exceed 50% of basic salary.
  • Payments are held in trust for a minimum of five years.
  • A resignation or departure for breach of contract generally results in the forfeiture of contribution for the year in which resignation occurred.
Pension
The Aviva Staff Pension Scheme (Pension Scheme) provides a competitive post retirement package.
  • Deferred cash payable on retirement in the form of a lump sum/monthly payment.

See details below (“Pension”).

 

Pension

In anticipation of pension legislation (“pension simplification”) that came into effect on 6 April 2006, the Committee undertook a review of the pension provisions for its senior executives and how they relate to the total remuneration package. The review was set against a number of design principles including:

  • The Company’s need to continue attracting and retaining top quality management;
  • That future pension arrangements for senior executives should not cost the Company more than the arrangements previously in place;
  • The Company would not pay or compensate managers for any increase in their personal tax liability arising from pension simplification; and
  • The long-term cost exposure associated with the current final salary arrangements should be reduced.

The relevant features of the Pension Scheme defined benefit section, to which all the executive directors belonged prior to 1 April 2006, are:

  • Accrual at either one thirtieth (Richard Harvey, Philip Scott and Patrick Snowball) or one forty-fifth (Andrew Moss) of final pensionable salary for each year of service (subject to a maximum pension of two-thirds of final pensionable salary);
  • A contribution of 5% of pensionable salary is payable into the Pension Scheme by the employee;
  • No pension benefits accrue on bonuses or other benefits;
  • Lump sum death-in-service benefit of four times basic salary at the date of death;
  • Spouse’s pension equal to two-thirds of a member’s actual or prospective pension;
  • Post-retirement, annual review with increases guaranteed at a rate equivalent to the increase in the Retail Prices Index up to a maximum of 10% pa; and
  • A normal retirement age of 60.

The benefits paid from the Pension Scheme to members who joined it after June 1989 were subject to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) limits (Earnings Cap) which restricted the amount of pension which could be paid from an approved pension scheme. Where executives’ benefits exceeded the Earnings Cap, the balance was provided through an Unapproved Unfunded Retirement Benefit (UURB). Richard Harvey and Andrew Moss were both affected by the Earnings Cap limit.

The effect of the pensions review on the executive directors was as follows:

Director Impact of pensions simplification review
Richard Harvey The value of Richard Harvey’s UURB up to the newly introduced HMRC Lifetime Allowance (LTA) of £1.5 million was transferred into the Pension Scheme and therefore at retirement he will receive a deferred pension of £75,000 per annum as increased in line with deferred pensions (lower of the increase in RPI or 5%) subject to the LTA. The balance, valued at £11.6 million, was transferred into an Employer Funded Retirement Benefit Scheme (EFRBS).
Andrew Moss The value of Andrew Moss’ UURB was transferred into the Pension Scheme and therefore at retirement he will receive a deferred pension of currently c.£20,000 pa. Further accrual in the pension scheme ceased from April 2006.
Philip Scott The value of Philip Scott’s pension benefits on 6 April 2006 was in excess of the LTA. Philip Scott elected to register with HMRC for enhanced protection. As a consequence, he will remain a member of the Pension Scheme; however he will not be entitled to accrue any additional entitlement and on retirement his benefits will be based upon his final pensionable salary and years of service at that time. On this basis, it is anticipated that Philip Scott will not be subject to a recovery charge (additional tax). Philip Scott will continue to pay an annual contribution of 5% of his basic salary to the Pension Scheme. Should any recovery charge become payable, the cost would be borne by Philip Scott.
Patrick Snowball The value of Patrick Snowball’s pension benefits on 6 April 2006 was in excess of the LTA, and he elected to register with HMRC for primary protection. As a consequence, he will continue to accrue benefits in the Pension Scheme but may be subject to a recovery charge (additional tax) on his benefits in excess of the amount registered. Patrick Snowball will continue to pay an annual contribution of 5% of his basic salary to the Pension Scheme. The cost of any recovery charge will be borne by Patrick Snowball.

Other benefits

In addition to the benefits described above, senior executives are entitled to the benefit of a company car allowance and private medical insurance.

UK all employee share plans

Senior executives are eligible to participate in a number of HMRC approved all-employee share plans in the United Kingdom on the same basis as other eligible employees. These include the Free Share element of the Aviva All-Employee Share Ownership Plan (AESOP). Under this plan, eligible employees can receive up to a maximum of £3,000 per annum in the form of shares from the profits of the Company’s UK business, free of tax, subject to a retention period. The partnership element of the AESOP allows participants to invest up to £125 per month out of their gross salary in the Company’s shares.

The Aviva Savings Related Share Option Scheme allows eligible employees to acquire options over the Company’s shares at a discount of up to 20% of their market value at the date of grant. In order to exercise these options, participants must have saved the consideration through a three, five or seven-year approved savings contract, subject to a maximum savings limit of £250 per month.

Executive directors’ service contracts

Service contracts agreed with each executive director incorporate their terms and conditions of employment. Contracts were reviewed during the year and new contracts issued, bringing them into line with good market practice in respect of mitigation and phased payments. The main objective of the contracts is to strike a fair balance between the Company’s and the employee’s interests taking into account good market practice. The key terms are as follows:

Provision Policy
Notice period  
By the director Six months
By the Company 12 months, rolling. No notice or payment in lieu to be paid where the Company terminates for cause.
Termination payment Pay in lieu of notice up to a maximum of 52 weeks’ basic salary. This may be increased by a discretionary redundancy payment (where appropriate) but any such further termination payment is capped at 52 weeks’ basic salary. Any amount is subject to mitigation and phased payments.
Remuneration and benefits As described in this Report. The detailed operation of the annual bonus and LTIP plans is at the Company’s discretion and in the case of the long-term savings plans at the trustees discretion.
Expenses Reimbursement reasonably incurred in accordance with their duties.
Holiday entitlement 30 working days plus public holidays.
Sickness In line with senior management terms ie 100% basic salary for 52 weeks, and 75% thereafter.
Non-complete During employment and for six months after leaving.
Contract dates Director Date current contract commenced
  Richard Harvey 6 December 2006
  Andrew Moss 16 January 2007
  Philip Scott 22 January 2007
  Patrick Snowball 15 November 2006

Policy on external Board appointments

The Company recognises that its senior executives can benefit by serving in a personal capacity as non-executive directors of non-Aviva Group companies. It therefore has a policy of allowing senior executives to serve as a non-executive director of an external company, subject to approval by the Board, and to retain any fee. However, during the year no executive director served in a personal capacity on the Board of a non-Aviva Group company.

Share ownership requirements

In line with investor guidelines, the Group Chief Executive and the executive directors are required to build, over a five-year period, a shareholding in the Company equivalent to 1.75 times annual salary and 1.5 times annual salary respectively.

Non-executive appointments

The non-executive directors, including the Chairman, have letters of appointment which set out their duties and responsibilities. The key terms of the appointments are as follows:

Provision Policy
Period Three-year term which can be extended by mutual consent.
Termination By the director or the Company giving the other one month’s written notice without compensation.
Fees As described below.
Expenses Reimbursement of travel and other expenses reasonably incurred in the performance of their duties.
Time commitment Between 25 and 50 days per annum depending upon Board and committee requirements and corporate activity.
Non-compete During employment and for six months after leaving.
Appointment dates Director Date of last appointment Date appointment terminates
  Guillermo de la Dehesa 30 May 2005 30 May 2008
  Wim Dik 7 December 2005 7 December 2008
  Mary Francis 1 October 2005 1 October 2008
  Richard Karl Goeltz 3 May 2004 3 May 2007
  Carole Piwnica 10 May 2006 AGM 2009
  Lord Sharman 14 January 2005 14 January 2008
  Russell Walls 3 May 2004 3 May 2007

Directors’ service contracts and letters of appointment are available for inspection at the Company’s registered office during normal hours of business. All the directors seeking re-election at the Company’s 2007 Annual General Meeting are independent non-executive directors and therefore do not have a service contract with the Company.

It is the Company’s policy to set the fees paid to its Chairman and non-executive directors at the median level for international companies of similar size and complexity. Non-executive directors receive a basic annual fee in respect of their Board duties. A further fee is paid to directors (other than the Chairman) in respect of their membership and, where appropriate, chairmanship of Board committees. Fees are reviewed regularly and are set by the Board to attract individuals with the range of skills and experience appropriate for a major international company. In determining the level of fees paid to the non-executive directors, the Board receives recommendations from the executive directors who consider the non-executive directors’ duties and responsibilities, together with the time commitment required in preparing for and attending meetings, and the amounts paid by competitors and similar-sized companies. The Chairman and non-executive directors receive no benefits in addition to their fees nor do they participate in any incentive or performance plans or pension arrangements.

Non-executive directors’ fees were reviewed in 2005 and will be reviewed again in 2007.

Directors’ remuneration in 2006

This section of the report sets out the remuneration paid or payable to the directors in respect of the year to 31 December 2006. The following sections headed “Directors’ Remuneration”, “Executive Directors’ Pension Arrangements” and “Share incentive plans” along with their associated footnotes have been subject to audit.

Basic salary decisions

The Committee’s decisions on basic salary increases were made in February 2006 (and implemented from 1 April 2006) against a backdrop of strong financial performance by the Group as reported in the Company’s 2005 Annual Report and Accounts.

In deciding basic salary increases, the Committee reviewed:

  • FTSE 50 basic salaries for executive directors;
  • Deloitte’s and Towers Perrin’s basic pay increase projections for 2006; and
  • Individual performance in the role, relative to positioning within the FTSE 50 comparator group.

The 1 April 2006 pay review resulted in an increase of 10% to the aggregate basic salaries of the executive directors. This included increases for Richard Harvey and Andrew Moss that brought their basic salaries into line with FTSE 50 peers and reflected Mr Moss’s increasing contribution to the Company. The basic salaries of the executive directors are positioned between the median and upper quartile ranking for companies with a market capitalisation over £16 billion. Given the executive directors’ contribution and experience the Committee considers this to be an appropriate position. The basic salary increases for the Company’s employees in the UK averaged 4% in 2006 and ranged from 0% to 15%.

Bonus decisions

In December 2005, the Remuneration Committee agreed business targets based upon the Group’s annual business plan and each executive director’s personal objectives. In August 2006 the financial assumptions used in the planning process were affirmed or amended by the Committee and in December 2006 it used its discretion to determine how corporate activity and changes in executive responsibilities during the year should be dealt with in deciding bonuses for 2006. In 2007, once the Group’s results for 2006 were known, the Committee determined the executive directors’ bonus payments. The Group’s strong financial performance in 2006 resulted in the bonuses shown in the directors’ remuneration table.

In 2006, customer and employee metrics were introduced to balance the financial objectives of the Annual Bonus Plan and to ensure that Aviva acted in the interests of all its stakeholders. As a result, 50% of the objectives were financial, 10% related to customer measures and 10% to employee morale and leadership. The final 30% of the bonus measures related to personal objectives. This split ensures that the environmental, social and governance responsibilities of Aviva are encouraged and that the performance measures address the broad range of Aviva’s objectives. The committee reviews the Annual Bonus Plan targets annually and has discretion to make changes.

Directors’ remuneration

  Basic salary/fees   Bonuses   ACAP   Benefits   Total
  2006
£’000
2005
£’000
  2006
£’000
2005
£’000
  2006
£’000
2005
£’000
  2006
£’000
2005
£’000
  2006
£’000
2005
£’000
Chairman  
Lord Sharman 375 48         375 48
Executive directors  
Richard Harvey 875 790   1,296 1,028   450   61 104   2,682 1,922
Andrew Moss 533 470   744 589   275   36 20   1,588 1,079
Philip Scott 543 515   680 583     63 54   1,286 1,152
Patrick Snowball 543 503   763 693     39 104   1,345 1,300
Non-executive directors    
Guillermo de la Dehesa 86 77         86 77
Wim Dik 69 59         69 59
Mary Francis 64 13         64 13
Richard Karl Goeltz 78 63         78 63
Carole Piwnica 74 56         74 56
Russell Walls 64 56         64 56
Former directors                            
Derek Stevens* 99 91         99 91
André Villeneuve* 65 59         65 59
Total emoluments of directors 3,468 2,800   3,483 2,893   725   199 282   7,875 5,975

* Retired on 31 December 2006.

The charts below illustrate the balance between basic salary and variable performance based compensation (annual bonus and long-term incentive plans) received by each executive director in the year to 31 December 2006.

Director's salary and compensation

 

Notes

  1. “Bonuses” include the value of shares granted under the free share part of the Aviva All-Employee Share Ownership Plan (maximum £3,000) and the total amounts earned in respect of 2006 performance under the Annual Bonus Plan (ie including the amounts deferred and granted in the form of shares).
  2. “Benefits”. All the executive directors received life assurance benefits during the year that relate to the cost incurred by the Company of insuring the directors’ life assurance and spouses’ benefits which, had they died during the year, could not have been wholly paid by the pension scheme and would therefore have been met by the Company. The disclosure also includes the cost of private medical insurance, and when appropriate, accompanied travel, accommodation and car benefits. All the numbers disclosed include the tax charged on the benefits. No directors received an expense allowance during the year.
  3. Payments to former directors: Since his retirement as a director in 2003, Anthony Wyand has served as a consultant and as a director on the Boards of some of the Group’s European operations. Under this arrangement, a fee of £145,000 was paid to him in 2006. During the year, shares granted to certain former executive directors under the company’s incentive plans vested. Details of these awards were fully disclosed in the year of grant.
  4. For the purposes of the disclosure required by Schedule 6 to the Companies Act 1985 the total aggregate emoluments of the directors in respect of 2006 was £7.9 million. (2005: £6.0 million).
  5. No compensation payment for loss of office was made to any director, or former director, during the year.
  6. Andrew Moss did not benefit from the LTIPs that vested in 2006 as he was not an employee in 2003, when they were granted.

Pension benefits

During the year to 31 March 2006, each of the executive directors accumulated pension benefits under the defined benefits section of the Pension Scheme. Richard Harvey and Andrew Moss, who were subject to the pre-April 2006 Earnings Cap, ceased accruing further benefits in the scheme from that date.

Executive directors’ pension arrangements

  Richard Harvey1
£’000
Andrew Moss2
£’000
Philip Scott3
£’000
Patrick Snowball3
£’000
Accrued annual pension at 1 January 2006 527 17 343 231
Transfer of UURB in excess of Lifetime Allowance (458)
Increase in accrued annual pension during the year as a result of inflation 4 12 8
Augmentation of benefits 20
Adjustment to accrued annual pension as a result of salary increase relative to inflation 2 6 13
Increase in accrued annual pension as a result of additional service 3 17
Accrued annual pension at 31 December 20064 75 20 361 289
Employee contributions during the year5 10 6 27 27
Transfer value of accrued pension at 31 December 20056 7,681 166 4,357 3,465
Transfer value of accrued pension at 31 December 20066 1,252 231 5,236 4,833
Change in transfer value during the period less employee contributions6 (6,433) 61 852 1,341
Age at 31 December 2006 (years) 56 48 52 56

Notes

  1. Mr Harvey was subject to the HMRC Earnings Cap; hence a large part of the liability to pay his pension fell outside the Pension Scheme and was provided by the Company through an UURB. In line with material changes affecting pensions which became effective from 6 April 2006 the Company crystallised the value of its liability for Mr Harvey’s UURB in excess of the LTA and transferred £11.6 million, being the actuarially calculated, and independently reviewed, value of the pension crystallised, into an EFRBS. As a result Mr Harvey’s pension benefit, post March 2006 is £75,000 pa. and subject to increase in line with deferred pensions (the lower of the increase in the Retail Prices Index or 5%) subject to the LTA. In addition Mr Harvey is entitled to a pension benefit of cNZ$25,000 pa from a New Zealand defined benefit scheme in respect of his service with the Group’s former operations in that country. In calculating the actuarial value of the amount to be transferred to the EFRBS an appropriate reduction was made to reflect the benefit of his New Zealand pension.

    The amount of the transfer of £11.6 million to the EFRBS was accounted for as follows:
    • Amount provided on the Company’s balance sheet for Richard Harvey as part of the IAS 19 charge at 31 March 2006, immediately prior to the change on 6 April 2006 is £10.8 million.
    • Less the amount of £700,000 transferred to the Pension Scheme to provide a pension up to the LTA.
    • The balance of £1.5 million was charged to the profit and loss account to take account of the increase in pension which would have been payable on his basic pay increase at 1 April 2006 (amount of pension increase £67,000 pa).
  2. Mr Moss ceased accrual in the pension scheme after 31 March 2006 and as a result his pension benefit, post March 2006 is c£20,000 pa and subject to increase in line with deferred pensions (the lower of the increase in the Retail Prices Index or 5%) subject to the LTA.
  3. Mr Snowball and Mr Scott have been accruing benefits in the Pension Scheme since before June 1989 and therefore were not subject to HMRC’s Earnings Cap and can continue to accrue benefits in the Pension Scheme, which they did throughout 2006. For a number of years Mr Snowball had been accruing additional benefits which were due to accrue uniformly up to his normal retirement date in 2010. Mr Snowball’s benefits were augmented to accrue in full in 2006, to reflect his increased duties following a restructuring of the UK businesses when no change was made to any other element of his remuneration. A payment of £429,000 was made into the pension scheme to fund this and therefore that part of the annual accrual ceased.
  4. The “accrued pension” is the amount of annual pension to which the directors would have been entitled at age 60 had they left service at 31 December 2006.
  5. Contributions of 5% of salary are made by Mr Scott and Mr Snowball towards their pension. As Mr Harvey and Mr Moss ceased accruing benefits in the Pension Scheme from March 2006 their 5% contributions ceased from that date and therefore the amounts disclosed are in relation to the period prior to that date.
  6. The change in the transfer values over the year include the effect of changes made by the Trustee of the Pension Scheme to the assumptions used in respect of the market value of future investment returns and mortality. The significant reduction in relation to Mr Harvey reflects the reduction in his accrued pension benefit to £75,000 pa as described in note 1 above. Transfer values represent the estimated liability on the Scheme to pay the stated level of benefits. They are not sums paid, or due, to a director and do not represent the true cost of providing the pension benefit.
  7. No former directors received any increase in retirement benefits in excess of the amount to which they were entitled on the later of the date when the benefits first became payable on 31 March 1997.

Share incentive plans

Details of the directors who held executive office for any part of the financial year, and hold or held options to subscribe for ordinary shares of the Company or hold or held awards over shares in the Company, pursuant to the Company’s share-based incentive plans, are set out below.

Savings related share options

These are options granted under the HMRC approved Savings Related Share Option Scheme. Options are normally exercisable during the six month period following the end of the relevant (three, five or seven year) savings contract.

  At 1 January 2006
Number
Options granted during year
Number
Options exercised during year
Number
Options lapsing during year
Number
At 31 December 2006
Number
Exercise price
p
Exercise period
Richard Harvey              
Savings related options 2002 4,426 4,426 401.0 December 2009 – May 2010
Andrew Moss              
Savings related options 2005 3,279 3,279 491.0 December 2010 – May 2011
Philip Scott              
Savings related options 2002 4,096 4,096 401.0 December 2007 – May 2008
Patrick Snowball              
Savings related options 2003 2,272 2,272 406.0 _

The mid-market price of an ordinary share in the Company on 29 December 2006, being the last business day of the year, was 822 pence, and the mid-market prices during the year ranged from 690 pence to 850.5 pence. During the year, directors made an aggregate gain of £8,355 upon the exercise of share options.

Share awards

The Aviva Long-Term Incentive Plan 2005 was approved by shareholders at the 2005 Annual General Meeting and is described above. This “2005 Plan” replaced the original Aviva Long-Term Incentive Plan (Aviva LTIP) which was approved by shareholders in 2001 and under which awards were made on an annual basis up to and including 2004.

Performance testing under the Aviva LTIP

Under the Aviva LTIP, which granted awards between 2001 and 2004, shares vest subject to the attainment of TSR and ROCE performance conditions over a three-year performance period. The Company’s TSR, when compared with the TSR of a comparator group of European financial services companies, needs to match at least median performance for 20% of the awards to vest. At upper decile performance, 70% of the awards vest. Between median and upper decile, vesting is determined on a straight-line basis. ROCE of 24% in excess of RPI over the three-year period results in 24% of the shares vesting, rising to a maximum of 30% if the ROCE exceeds 30% over the same period.

At the end of the performance period relating to the awards granted in 2003, the Company was ranked eight out of the 20 companies in the comparator group and the ROCE was 33.6%. As a result, 34.9% of the awards vested based on the TSR part of the Plan and 30.0% of the awards vested based on the ROCE part, making a total of 64.9% vested. The 35.1% of the awards, which did not vest, lapsed.

The vesting history under the Aviva LTIP is as follows:

  Percentage of award vesting
Year of grant Performance period ROCE TSR Total
2001 January 2001 to December 2003 21.7 0.0 21.7
2002 January 2002 to December 2004 23.3 23.0 46.3
2003 January 2003 to December 2005 30.0 34.9 64.9

Performance graph

The following graph compares the TSR performance of the Company over the past five years with the TSR of the FTSE 100 Return Index. This index has been chosen because it is a recognised equity market index, of which Aviva is a member. The graph also includes the median TSR of the companies in the comparator group as this is the group against which performance is measured for the purpose of the Aviva Long-Term Incentive Plan. The companies which compose the comparator group for TSR purposes were amended when the new Long-Term Incentive Plan was introduced in 2005 so that the group matches more closely the companies which offer similar products in similar geographic markets to Aviva. The TSR graph for the comparator group has therefore been plotted using the 19 companies (excluding Aviva) in the comparator group pre-2005 and the 14 companies (excluding Aviva) in the group for 2005 and 2006.

Aviva five-year TSR performance against the FTSE100 Index and the median of the Comparator Group

Aviva five-year TSR performance against the FTSE100 Index and the median of the Comparator Group

 

The Aviva Annual Bonus Plan was approved by shareholders in April 2005 and it replaced the Aviva Deferred Bonus Plan.

The Aviva Deferred Bonus Plan was approved by shareholders at the 2001 Annual General Meeting. The awards disclosed include those made in lieu of some or all of the cash bonus earned and deferred under the Company’s Annual Bonus Plan and also the matching awards granted on a “one-for-one” basis. The vesting of the awards on the third anniversary of their grant is not subject to performance conditions. This plan was replaced by the Aviva Annual Bonus Plan in 2005 and therefore no awards have been granted under the Plan since 2005.

The Aviva Share Plan was established in May 2004 specifically to facilitate the recruitment of Andrew Moss. The awards made under the Plan compensate Andrew Moss for the value of the long-term incentive awards granted to him by his previous employer and which lapsed when he resigned to join Aviva. Andrew Moss is the only participant in the Plan. On 10 May 2004, the date Andrew Moss joined the Company, 103,846 shares in the Aviva Employee Trust (with a market value of £540,000) were allocated to him. On 31 October 2004 67,307 of the shares vested, 23,077 vested on 31 December 2005 and the balance of 13,462 vested on 31 December 2006. The vesting of these shares was not subject to any performance conditions. This plan is now closed.

Long-Term Incentive Plan Awards

  At 1 January 2006
Number
Awards granted during year
Number
Awards vesting during year
Number
Awards lapsing during year
Number
At 31 December 2006
Number
Market price at date awards granted
p
Market price at date awards vested
p
Vesting date
Richard Harvey  
Aviva Long-Term Incentive Plan  
– 2003 175,000 113,575 61,425 379.5 822.0 March 2006
– 2004 139,059 139,059 527.5 March 2007
Aviva Long-Term Incentive Plan 2005  
– 2005 207,437 207,437 633.5 March 2008
– 2006 170,731   170,731 814.0 March 2009
Aviva Deferred Bonus Plan  
– 2003 127,750 127,750 379.5 822.0 March 2006
– 2004 118,478 118,478 527.5 March 2007
– 2005 109,764 109,764 633.5 March 2008
Aviva Annual Bonus Plan  
– 2006 83,317 83,317 814.0 March 2009
Andrew Moss  
Aviva Share Plan 13,462 13,462 520.0 834.0 December 2006
Aviva Long-Term Incentive Plan  
– 2004 83,650 83,650 535.0 August 2007
Aviva Long-Term Incentive Plan 2005  
– 2005 102,803 102,803 633.5 March 2008
– 2006 87,804 87,804 814.0 March 2009
Aviva Deferred Bonus Plan  
– 2005 61,408 61,408 633.5 March 2008
Aviva Annual Bonus Plan  
– 2006 47,648 47,648 814.0 March 2009
Philip Scott  
Aviva Long-Term Incentive Plan  
– 2003 111,250 72,201 39,049 379.5 822.0 March 2006
– 2004 88,867 88,867 527.5 March 2007
Aviva Long-Term Incentive Plan 2005  
– 2005 116,822 116,822 633.5 March 2008
– 2006 95,121 95,121 814.0 March 2009
Aviva Deferred Bonus Plan  
– 2003 80,100 80,100 379.5 822.0 March 2006
– 2004 68,960 68,960 527.5 March 2007
– 2005 68,690 68,690 633.5 March 2008
Aviva Annual Bonus Plan  
– 2006 47,138 47,138 814.0 March 2009
Patrick Snowball  
Aviva Long-Term Incentive Plan  
– 2003 96,250 62,466 33,784 379.5 822.0 March 2006
– 2004 84,452 84,452 527.5 March 2007
Aviva Long-Term Incentive Plan 2005  
– 2005 107,943 107,943 633.5 March 2008
– 2006 95,121 95,121 814.0 March 2009
Aviva Deferred Bonus Plan  
– 2003 35,612 35,612 379.5 822.0 March 2006
– 2004 70,802 70,802 527.5 March 2007
– 2005 67,068 67,068 633.5 March 2008
Aviva Annual Bonus Plan  
– 2006 56,100 56,100 814.0 March 2009

Dilution

Awards granted under the Aviva Annual Bonus Plan 2005 and the Aviva Long-Term Incentive Plan 2005 are met by the issue of new shares at the time that the awards vest. The Committee monitors the number of shares issued under its various all employee and discretionary share plans and their effect on dilution limits. The relevant dilution limits established by the Association of British Insurers in respect of all share plans (10% in any rolling ten year period) and executive share plans (5% in any rolling ten year period) were, based on the Company’s issued share capital at 31 December 2006, 2.60% and 1.12% respectively.

Between March 1998 and March 2003, the Company met its liability for shares awarded under the incentive plans by funding an employee trust that acquired shares in the market at the time of grant. Details of the shares currently held in the employee trusts are set out in note 29 to the accounts.

Accounting changes

Major changes to accounting policies and practices in 2005, including adopting International Financial Reporting Standards and European Embedded Value principles for supplementary reporting, affected a number of the key performance indicators and performance measures used in connection with the Company’s long-term incentive plans. During the transition period the Committee received reports showing the impacts of these changes on the performance measures and satisfied itself that the evaluation of actual performance against the performance conditions which were originally set using prior accounting practices is appropriate having made allowance for the accounting changes.

Senior executives’ remuneration

The total compensation paid during the year to key management personnel, being those having authority and responsibility for planning, directing and controlling the activities of the Company, including the Company’s directors and non-executive directors (as required to be disclosed by International Accounting Standard 24) was £53 million (2005: £34 million) and is set out below in note 53 to the Accounts.

Non-executive directors’ remuneration

The Company’s Articles of Association provide that the total aggregate remuneration paid to the Chairman and non-executive directors will be determined by the Board within the limits set by shareholders. The current aggregate limit of £1.5 million was approved by shareholders at the Company’s 2005 Annual General Meeting. Executive directors are remunerated under their service contracts and receive no additional fee for serving as directors.

Chairman £375,000 pa
Board membership fee £50,000 pa
Additional fees are paid as follows:
Senior independent director £10,000 pa
Committee Chairman – Audit (inclusive of committee membership fee) £35,000pa
  – Remuneration (inclusive of committee membership fee) £20,000 pa
Committee Membership – Audit £10,000 pa
  – Remuneration £10,000 pa
  – Nomination £5,000 pa
  – Risk and Regulatory £5,000 pa
  – Corporate Social Responsibility £5,000 pa

Other than for the Chairman’s fee, which was increased by £15,000 pa from 1 January 2006 to reflect the loss of a car allowance of £18,000 pa from that date, no increases were made to the level of directors’ fees during the year. However, fees payable to the senior independent director, chairman of the Remuneration Committee and for membership of the Risk and Regulatory and Corporate Social Responsibility committees were introduced from 1 April 2006 following changes to the Board committee structure and directors’ responsibilities.

In addition to the Board membership and committee membership fees Derek Stevens received an additional amount of £10,000 per annum for serving as the chairman of the Aviva Staff Pension Scheme. The fee for Guillermo de la Dehesa includes an amount of € 40,000 per annum for serving as the non-executive chairman of the Group’s operations in Spain. No non-executive director accrued retirement benefits during the year.

Directors’ interests in Aviva shares

The interests held by each person who was a director at the end of the financial year in the ordinary shares of 25 pence each in the Company are shown below. All the disclosed interests are beneficial. The table also summarises the interests in shares held through the Company’s various all-employee and executive share schemes. View details of the options and long-term incentive awards and the Aviva Share Plan.

  Shares1   Bonus Plan Awards2   Long-Term Incentive Awards3   Options4   Aviva Share Plan5
  1 January
2006
31 December
2006
  1 January
2006
31 December
2006
  1 January
2006
31 December
2006
  1 January
2006
31 December
2006
  1 January
2006
31 December
2006
Guillermo de la Dehesa 144 144        
Wim Dik 200 200        
Mary Francis 1,000 1,000        
Richard Karl Goeltz 2,500 2,500        
Richard Harvey 44,781 198,758   355,992 311,559   521,496 517,227   4,426 4,426  
Andrew Moss 35,040 43,337   61,408 109,056   186,453 274,257   3,279 3,279   13,462
Carole Piwnica 2,500        
Philip Scott 170,004 274,896   217,750 184,788   316,939 300,810   4,096 4,096  
Lord Sharman 2,000        
Patrick Snowball 16,250 22,815   173,482 193,970   288,645 287,516   2,272  
Russell Walls 1,500 1,500        
Former directors  
Derek Stevens* 2,989 3,047        
André Villeneuve* 640 640        

* Retired 31 December 2006.

Notes

  1. “Shares” are the directors’ beneficial holdings in the ordinary shares of the Company and in respect of the executive directors include shares held in trust under the Company’s All Employee Share Ownership Plan (AESOP) being shares purchased by them under the partnership element and shares granted under the free share element of the AESOP. Executive directors are required to build and maintain a beneficial interest in the Company’s shares equal in value to 1.5 times their annual salary (1.75 times annual salary in the case of the Group Chief Executive). The requirement was introduced as part of the revised remuneration arrangements from 2005; the holding must be attained within five years.
  2. “Bonus Plan Awards” relates to entitlements to shares arising through the current, or former, Aviva Bonus Plans. Under these plans some of the earned bonuses are paid in the form of shares and deferred for three years. The transfer of the shares to the director at the end of the period is not subject to the attainment of performance conditions but a proportion of the shares can be forfeited if the executive leaves service before the end of the period.
  3. “Long-Term Incentive Awards” are awards granted under the Aviva Long-Term Incentive Plans which vest only if the performance conditions are achieved.
  4. “Options” are options over shares granted under the Savings Related Share Option Scheme.
  5. “Aviva Share Plan” relates to shares held under the Plan referred to above in which only Andrew Moss participated.

The following changes to directors’ interests which relate to shares acquired each month under the partnership element of the AESOP during the period 1 January 2006 to 28 February 2007 have been reported to the Company.

  Number of shares
Richard Harvey 14
Philip Scott 15
Patrick Snowball 14

This report was reviewed and approved by the Board on
28 February 2007.

 

Richard Karl Goeltz
Chairman, Remuneration Committee